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INTRODUCTION
Questions concerning the evolutionary origin of human language
are now the focus of a rapidly growing and systematic body of research
(e.g., Pinker (1994), Christiansen; Kirby (2003), Hurford, Studdert-Kennedy;
Knight (1998), Nowak; Krakauer (1999), Calvin; Bickerton (2000), inter allia
). Although neuroscientists, philosophers and anthropologists have been in-
terested on the topic for slightly different reasons, from the point of view of
modern linguistic theory, the emergence of ‘evolutionary linguistics’ is the
ultimate implication of a 50 years old research program that strives to build
a coherent picture of the linguistic capacity of Homo sapiens within a broa-
der understanding of human cognition and behavior (Chomsky (1965, 2001),
Pinker; Bloom (1990), Hauser; Chomsky; Fitch (2002)).
In this work we offer a model on the evolution of a particular piece
of natural languages grammars that shows, among other things, how a
cooperative effort between evolutionary linguistics and semantic theory may
be directly illuminating to the field. This necessary cross-talk between se-
mantic theory and evolutionary linguistics has lagged behind in relation to
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equivalent applications for other sub-disciplines of linguistics, such as pho-
nology and syntax (cf. Hurford; Studdert-Kennedy; Knight (1998)). The work
is embedded, in both methodology and substance, within a theoretical fra-
mework for Evolutionary Linguistics currently under development (Carva-
lho (2005), Carvalho (submitted), Carvalho (in prep.)).
SOME BACKGROUND ON EVOLUTIONARY THEORY
As the central source of theoretical integration for the biological
sciences (Dobzhansky et al. (1977)), Evolutionary Theory furnishes a ratio-
nale for the pursuit of many kinds of questions: one may be interested on the
evolutionary interpretation of the fossil record (Simpson (1944)), on the
mechanisms of inheritance and replication (Dawkins (1976), Williams (1975))
or on the emergence and maintenance of complex adaptive structures (Da-
wkins (1983), Maynard Smith (1969)).
As I argue elsewhere (Carvalho (in prep.)), evolutionary linguis-
tics (and maybe, theories about the evolution of cognition in general) should
concentrate on the construction of hypothesis concerning the phylogenetic
distribution of cognitive traits involved in linguistic behavior, which impli-
es also hypothesis on putative character-state transitions, their characteris-
tics in ancestral stages as well as a primary role for comparative data and
criteria for hypothesis-choice.1,2 Granting that this is not the correct place for
the justification of this position, some remarks are nonetheless necessary.
Within the primarily historical approach to phylogenetic recons-
truction (Kemp (1985), Kluge (1999)) two complementary but independent
ways to approach the problem are usually described (cf. Lauder (1982),
Desutter-Grandcolas et al. (2003), O‘Hara (1988)): on one hand, the resear-
cher may focus its study on the chronicle of the character-state transitions
that occurred during the process of phylogenetic descent under scrutiny, on
the other he may  suggest hypothesis on the scenario of evolutionary forces
and processes that caused the character transformations to come about and
ultimately promoted their fixation or maintenance within particular popula-
tions. This division of labor for evolutionary studies has also been success-
1 Another useful consequence of this program is that the use of phylogenetic
reconstruction models forces the language evolution researcher to spell-out clearly its background
assumptions on the nature of evolutionary processes (Kemp (1985)), a situation that is obviously
at variance with the current standards of inquiry in the field.
2 This approach differs markedly, but is complementary to, the standard approach
within evolutionary psychology (cf. Tooby; Cosmides (1989)).
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fully applied to the study of the evolution of hominid and primate social
behavior (Foley; Lee (1989)) and has been seen as a topic of major relevance
for the social sciences (Boyd et al. (1997)).
The first approach is deeply related to some central topics curren-
tly under debate within Evolutionary Theory, such as the nature of the “phe-
notypic space” of possible characters, the role of constraints and the issue of
complexity in evolution (Kauffman (1993), Lauder (1982), McShea (1991)).
It is exactly this question that will be addressed by the present work in a
more direct fashion. Even tough the other, “functional” question, is clearly
the central concern of any evolutionary study (Mayr (1961)), it will be dis-
cussed without deeper considerations in the final section.
1 GRAMMARS AND THEIR (LONG) HISTORY
Along with some recent trends in Linguistic Theory (Chomsky (1995),
Kean (2003)) we will accept, as a minimal specification for natural languages
grammars, a definite relation  R(S, P)  holding between “sound” (here, P) and
“meaning” (here, S). Although obviously simplistic, models of this kind have
also been useful in Learnability Theory (Wexler; Culicover (1980)) as well as
in Evolutionary Theory (Boyd; Richerson (1985)), when empirical faithfulness
may be relaxed if some improvement in comprehension is achieved. Beyond
this gross statement, we can further specify our model in the following direc-
tions: (1) the set P stands actually for some non-empty set of “units of imple-
mentation”, not necessarily of an acoustic-vocal modality; (2) S stands for a
non-empty set of “information” units coded in the signals used for communi-
cation; specifically, it denotes information in a sense closer to “meaning” or
“representations” (intentions) and not information in the technical sense of the
mathematical theory of information, quantified as “ambiguity” decrease. And
finally (3) we define R (S, P) as a very specific kind of relation, namely a
bijective function. This means that R(S, P)  defines a set S x P (a cartesian
product), such that S x P = {<xi , yi> / xi S , yi P}. This much said, our
preliminary relation R(S, P) may stand for an arbitrary set of signals em-
ployed for communication.
Before moving ahead, a comment is needed. One may wonder what
does it mean to say that a sound-meaning pairing relation is the “minimal
specification” for a grammar or an intentional communication device of a
different sort. I will assume the position, accepted among generative lin-
guists since the demise of the Derivational Theory of Complexity, that lin-
guists are working at a level of analysis similar to the level proposed by
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David Marr (1982) to the task of describing cognitive agents as information-
processing mechanisms where the function or problem to be computed is
specified (cf. Berwick; Weinberg (1984)). Then, to say that some particular
object or property is part of this “minimal” specification might mean that
any of the possible algorithmic (“low-level”) approaches to the computatio-
nal problem will need to instantiate or represent it. In the case of natural
language, the existence of apparently misplaced elements heading chains
derived through movement is a strong candidate for the status of one such
“minimal” element (Pesetsky (1997)).
As its stands, it is obvious that in order for the definition of our
putative pre-grammatical system of communication to work, we need the
domain set, S, to be “equinumerous” to the range set P. That is, it should be
the case that S = P. Assuming however that S grows too large, there is
a way to bring order to our system. In terms of a set of signals used for
communication, “order” could mean what Optimality-Theoretic systems for
syntax call ‘interpretability’ (Pesetsky (1997)): all the semantic signals (mem-
bers of S) should find some way to be coded into the “interface” code of the
implementing system (members of P). The way whereby this kind of inter-
pretation demand may be fulfilled is through the action of a simple combi-
natorial principle called “the Pigeonhole Principle”: in intuitive terms it sta-
tes that whenever you have n+1 pigeons trying to match into n pigeonholes
then it is the case that some pigeonhole will house more than one pigeon. In
more formal terms, it means that formal objects like < x1 , xi. ...xn ; yi > , for
xi∈ S and  yi∈ P are now allowed within the set of objects defined by our
function R (S, P). As it turns out, this kind of object, allowing for many-to-
one mappings of meaning units into implementing units, is exactly the sort
of object that results from the application of morphological principles for-
cing (lexically) distinct bundle of features to cluster (e.g., Harley; Noyer
(1999), Embick; Noyer (2001)). As a final note, the application of the Pigeo-
nhole Principle is theoretically coherent with our assumption, made explicit
in the previous paragraph, about which level of analysis we are working at,
given that the principle in itself does not provides an algorithm to find the
complex objects that it allows for, it only states that such objects exist (cf.
Brualdi (1998)).
I would like to insist in the point, denied by some commentators of
earlier drafts of this paper, that the above mentioned (cf. Abstract) conver-
gence of results does not trivialize the model here presented. Indeed, not
only Game Theoretic models of language evolution, but also some studies
on the ontogeny of language, seem to suggest a “critical mass” scenario
(e.g. Marchman; Bates (1994)), where an enlargement in the number of inde-
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pendent signals (“words”) may lead to dramatic reorganizations of our sys-
tem, maybe converging on the appearance of grammar-like patterns, such
as clustering or concatenation. Nevertheless, to say that there are “trivi-
alizing” implications between these results really ignores all the fun about
these hypotheses. The present work was founded upon the analysis of possi-
ble chains of “character states” whereby a small part of the human langua-
ge faculty may have passed during its evolution. It is mainly a talk about
phenotypes and the relevant phenotypic space to represent different charac-
ter states or taxa in a phylogenetic analysis. This result was held to be
significant for the continuity/discontinuity debate because most of the alter-
native accounts of language evolution that argued for discontinuity did so
on the basis that they could not conceive of a gradual transition from wha-
tever you may consider an “ancestral communication system” to language,
through a series of functional states (e.g. Bickerton (1990)). This kind of
result, significantly modest from the perspective of an ideal and exhaustive
account of the phylogenetic origins of language, cannot tell under which
conditions this “grammar like” device of communication would be an “un-
beatable strategy” for a population of speakers, whether there are many
different such strategies or whether there is none. This is the task of Evolu-
tionary Game Theory. In a classic text of the field, John Maynard Smith
(1982) notes how these two approaches have been largely independently
carried by researchers:
... In practice, too much effort is put into seeking an optimum and
not enough into defining the phenotype set. In the Hawk-Dove
Game, for example, considerable sophistication has been devoted
in analysing the game, but the strategy set is ridiculously naïve.
(...) My reply to this complaint would be that it wrongly identifies
the purpose of the Hawk-Dove Game, which is not to represent any
specific animal example, but to reveal the logical possibilities (for
example, the likelihood of mixed strategies) inherent in all con-
test situations. When confronted with specific cases, much more
care must be taken in establishing the strategy set. (p. 5-6, Italics
mine).
The quotation above demonstrates not only the complementary
roles played by evolutionary game theory and by the creation of hypothesis
concerning character states and their interrelations, but also shows how the
latter can inform the former. In special, the present work is about not being
“ridiculously naïve” about the relevant phenotypes.
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2  MEANING MEETS THE NATURAL WORLD
We can now present some hypothesis, available in the literature on
language evolution, that may possibly account for this enrichment of semantic
representations, that in turn, following our scenario above described, might
have lead to some crucial reorganizations in some putative ancestral communi-
cation device.
First of all, it is interesting to observe how the approach described
in this paper seems to be reasonable from the point of view of phylogenetic
analysis. As we try to account for some of the descriptions of the communi-
cation repertoires of non-human primates, we can see that the application of
the Pigeonhole Principle is subject to functional constraints (“communicati-
ve functions”) and isn’t in any sense a necessary outcome of an increase in
semantic complexity. Some well-described primate species, such as the Ge-
lada (Cercopithecus aethiops) or some species of baboons (Papio cynoce-
phalus ursinus) show a striking asymmetry: on the one hand they show
amazingly complex cognitive capacities to represent and manipulate infor-
mation concerning features of their social world (e.g., third-party relations;
kinship/status ranking of different individuals ) but nonetheless, not even a
small fraction of this complex knowledge network is actualized in their (rich)
system of vocal communication (cf. Cheney; Seyfarth (1990), Seyfarth; Che-
ney; Bergman (2005)). The burden of the research could then be focused on
the specification of the adaptive problems and selective pressures that, in
our lineage, effected that contingent transition and caused the spread and
improvement of communication devices with semi-grammatical routines at
the expense of simpler one that consisted in little more than sets of indepen-
dent signals, as presented in the previous section.
From this perspective we can start from the observation that many
researchers have pursuit the idea that many of the unique intellectual and
behavioral capacities of primates, as well as their high levels of encephali-
zation, may be due to strong adaptive pressures for cognitive processes
related to “social navigation”  (Humphrey (1976)). The different incarnations
of this proposal have been diversely labeled, such as “the social brain hypo-
thesis” (Dunbar (2003)) or the “Machiavellian intelligence hypothesis” (Byr-
ne; Whiten (1988)) but the rationale behind them is the same. Relative to the
representational capacities underlying language, Robert Worden (1998) pro-
posed that the hierarchical organization of syntactic-semantic knowledge in
natural languages furnishes a direct testimonial to the representational ba-
sis of social knowledge from which it was co-opted during evolution. Wor-
den uses a single formal apparatus to describe the primate-typical social
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knowledge database and to represent small pieces of natural language se-
mantics (fig.1).This kind of “script” representation is extremely popular in
AI knowledge engineering:
                                                                   F
Fig.1. A script in Robert Worden‘s notation for representing primate social knowledge
networks and (possibly) syntactic-semantic knowledge too.
One of the striking implications of work under the aegis of the
“social brain hypothesis” is that it also calls for an integration of semantic
theories with non-linguistic domains of representation. Under this perspecti-
ve, psycholinguistic work such as those developed by Ray Jackendoff, Leo-
nard Talmy and Steven Pinker are really welcomed in this integrative effort
(e.g., Jackendoff (1983)).Together with the growing interest in ‘cognitive etho-
logy’ approaches to the study of animal behavior (Griffin (1992)) this promi-
sing line of research is suggesting that many of the cognitive underpinnings
for linguistic behavior are actually quite ancestral traits, and not the result
of unique events and contingencies of our recent hominid history (cf. Mar-
cus (2004)).
Alex Martin’s work on visual imagery and higher level visual pro-
cessing as representations co-opted to language during evolution offers ano-
ther promising line of research on the role of semantics in understanding
language evolution (e.g., Martin (1998)). The idea relies on the existence of
uniquely primate temporal lobe regions (Sanides (1975) that support the
processing of object-related features as well as their matching with previous
experienced stimuli. The relation with language is established by the huge
amount of evidence (cf. Damasio (1990), Usui et al.(2003), Hickok; Poeppel
(2004)) pointing to the fact that the temporal lobe homologues in humans
act in the storage of semantic representations and play some role too in their
conversion into phonological information.
This last section of our presentation sketches some lines of resear-
ch that are, in our opinion, highly promising to the task of unraveling the
adaptive nature of language and its phylogenetic status. The so-called “so-
cial brain hypothesis” furnishes a powerful research program and theoreti-
cal integrative force for a range of disciplines, from primatology and paleo-
ho
sr
se
en
sr
se
sound:
“Fred”
id: Fred
cla: human
CARVALHO, F. O. LANGUAGE PHYLOGENY AND THE EVOLUTION...
220 REVISTA LETRAS, CURITIBA, N. 69, P. 213-224, MAIO/AGO. 2006. EDITORA UFPR.
anthropology to evolutionary psychology and neuroscience. Studies on the
representation of knowledge in primate brains lends support to the hypothe-
sis that higher-level visual areas (mainly those concerned with object recog-
nition in posterior temporal areas) and higher level sensory cortices related
to socially significant tasks such as individual recognition, could have been
co-opted as storage sites for semantic features assembled to form lexical
items (Martin (1998), Pulvermuller (2003)) As we argue elsewhere, (Carva-
lho (in prep.)) the other approaches that emphasize both comparative as well
as neuroscientific data should be taken seriously as a way to constrain the
densely populated space of hypothesis that abound in the field of ‘evolutio-
nary linguistics’.
3  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
In this work we presented some work in progress concerning a
specific hypothesis, as well as a particular research program that legitima-
tes it, within the rapidly growing field of approaches to the evolutionary
characterization of our language faculty. The hypothesis is acknowledged
as being still in an undesirable form relative to an ideal framing (i.e., neu-
roscientific or neurocomputational) that, in our view, maximizes the frui-
tfulness of traditional phylogenetic approaches. In particular, the framing of
the functional hypothesis here sketched in terms of a full-fledged processing
theory (e.g., Anderson‘s ACT-R (Anderson et al. (2004)) should make possible
the establishment of a number of processing constraints (e.g., working-me-
mory loads, list- and frequency-effects on particular lexical items) that, taken
as background assumptions on the system‘s efficiency, could (or not) select
for the reorganization that we propose in this paper (i.e., the use of the
Pigeonhole Principle) as an optimal solution for the system that deviates
from simple bijectivity between signal and meaning units. If our proposed
strategy in no way follows from independently motivated constraints under
some criteria of optimality, then the hypothesis may be doubted. In this way,
and contrary to some comments of referees on drafts of this paper, the hypo-
thesis is actually testable, but only with some utterly necessary auxiliary
hypothesis. These qualifications are in harmony with our observations on
the allocation of the present work within Marr‘s research strategy for the
analysis of cognitive agents (cf. section 1), as questions of efficiency, re-
source allocation and so on are posed at a lower level of algorithmic speci-
fication.
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Some of the most significant aspects of our hypothesis deal with
the role that semantic theory, among all subfields of linguistics, might play
in a coherent and exhaustive evolutionary linguistics. Although our semi-
formal model focuses on a rather simplistic notion of semantic complexity,
assessed by the size of set S, it may, nevertheless, prompt the hypothesis to
some low-level description in computational terms. These aspects are hi-
ghlighted by pointing out the relevance of independently motivated hypothe-
sis and approaches in bringing about this absolutely demanding and rich
theoretical contact, as exemplified by the putative relations between the se-
mantic substrate of language and general cognitive and perceptual adapta-
tions of the primate order.
ABSTRACT
This paper addresses one specific hypothesis on the phylogeny
of the human language faculty where semantic theory might
play a central role. It is shown how an increase in semantic
complexity within a hypothesized communication device may
lead, through the action of a single combinatorial principle, to
the emergence of a set of well-known grammatical
representations afforded by UG, namely, a mapping relation
including morphological subroutines. Comparative data from
non-human primate cognition is taken into account and a
sketch of the possible functional forces behind the transition
from morphology-less grammars is examined. The hypothesis
presented converges with independent work on language
ontogeny (e.g., MARCHMAN; BATES (1994), PLUNKETT;
MARCHMAN (1993)) as well as with results from game-
theoretic approaches to language evolution (NOWAK;
KRAKAUER (1999), NOWAK; PLOTKIN; JANSEN (2000)).
Besides this striking result, a strong connection with Linguistic
Theory and the rest of  Cognitive Science is enforced, a state of
affairs not easily found in the general literature on the evolution
of language.
Key-words: language evolution; semantic theory; grammar-
cognition interfaces.
RESUMO
O presente trabalho examina uma hipótese particular acerca
da caracterização evolucionária da faculdade humana de
linguagem em que a teoria semântica pode ter um papel crucial.
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Mostra-se, em particular, como o aumento na complexidade de
um mecanismo hipotético de comunicação pode levar, através
da ação de um princípio combinatório simples, a emergência
de um conjunto específico de representações fornecido pela
GU, permitindo a presença de mapeamentos capazes de definir
rotinas morfológicas. Dados comparativos relativos à cognição
de primatas não-humanos são levados em consideração, assim
como algumas hipóteses acerca das forças funcionais por trás
das transições a partir de mecanismos nos quais as
representações morfológicas estejam ausentes, são examinados.
A hipótese articulada converge com uma série de trabalhos
sobre a ontogênese da linguagem (e.g., MARCHMAN; BATES
(1994), PLUNKETT; MARCHMAN (1993)) e com resultados
advindos da Teoria dos Jogos (NOWAK; KRAKAUER (1999),
NOWAK; PLOTKIN; JANSEN (2000)). Além desse resultado
significativo (que insistimos como não sendo de modo algum
trivial) uma ligação forte com a Teoria Lingüística e com as
Ciências Cognitivas é reforçada, uma situação que nem sempre
é contemplada na literatura sobre a evolução filogenética da
linguagem.
Palavras-chave: evolução da linguagem; teoria semântica;
interfaces cognição-gramática.
REFERENCES
ANDERSON, J. et al. An integrated theory of mind. Psychological Review, v. 111, n. 4, 2004.
BERWICK, R.; WEINBERG, A. The grammatical basis of linguistic performance, 1984. MIT
Press.
BOYD, R.; RICHERSON, P. Culture and the evolutionary process. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1985.
_____. et al. Are cultural phylogenies possible? In: WEINGART, P. et al. (Eds.). Human by
Nature, Between Biology and the Social Sciences. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1997.
BRUALDI, R. Introductory combinatorics. [S.l.]: Prentice Hall, 1998.
BYRNE, R.; WHITEN, A. Machiavellian Intelligence. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988.
CALVIN, W.; BICKERTON, D. Lingua Ex Machina. 2000. MIT Press.
CARVALHO, F. O. A morfologia como parte de FLN (Faculty of Language Narrow). Trabalho
apresentado no 4. Congresso Internacional da Associação Brasileira de Lingüística - Abralin,
2005.
_____. Why 5% of grammar is good enough. Submitted.
_____. Princípios de evolução da linguagem: fundamentos biológicos da teoria lingüística.
Monograph (Undergraduate) - Universidade de Brasília (UnB). No prelo.
CHENEY, D.; SEYFARTH, R. How monkeys see the world. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1990.
REVISTA LETRAS, CURITIBA, N. 69, P. 213-224, MAIO/AGO. 2006. EDITORA UFPR. 223
CARVALHO, F. O. LANGUAGE PHYLOGENY AND THE EVOLUTION...
CHOMSKY, N. Aspects of the theory of syntax. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1965.
_____. The minimalist program. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995.
_____. Beyond Explanatory Adequacy. Cambridge, Massachussetts, 2001. MIT Occasional
Papers in Linguistics 20.
CHRISTIANSEN, M.; KIRBY, S. Language evolution: consensus and controversies. Trends in
Cognitive Sciences, v. 7, n. 7, 2003.
DAMASIO, A. Category-related recognition defects as a clue to the neural substrates of
knowledge. Trends in Neurosciences, v. 13, 1990.
DAWKINS, R. The selfish gene. Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 1976.
_____. Universal darwinism. In: BENDALL, D. (Ed.). Evolution from molecules to men.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.
DESUTTER-GRANDCOLAS, L.; D‘HAESE, C.; ROBILLARD, T. The problem of characters
suscetible to parallel evolution: with emphasis on cave-life phenotypic evolution. Cladistics,
v. 19, 2003.
DOBZHANSKY, T. et. al. Evolution. New York: W.H. Freeman & Co., 1977.
DUNBAR, R. The social brain: mind, language and society in evolutionary perspective.
Annual Review of Anthropology, v. 32, 2003.
EMBICK, D.; NOYER, R. Movement operations after syntax  Linguistic Inquiry, v.  32, 2001.
FOLEY, R.; LEE, P. Finite social space, evolutionary pathways and reconstructing hominid
behaviour. Science, v. 243, 1989.
GRIFFIN, D. Animal minds. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992.
HARLEY, H.; NOYER, R. Distributed morphology. Glot International, v. 4, 1999.
HAUSER, M.; CHOMSKY, N.; FITCH, T. The faculty of language: what is it, who has it and
how did it evolve? Science, v. 298, 2002.
HICKOK, G.; POEPPEL, D. Dorsal and ventral streams: a framework for understanding
aspects of the functional organization of language. Cognition, v. 92, 2004.
HURFORD, J.; STUDDERT-KENNEDY, M.; KNIGHT, C. (Eds.). Approaches to the evolution of
language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
JACKENDOFF, R. Semantics and cognition. 1983. MIT Press.
KAUFFMAN, S. The origins of order: self-organization and selection in evolution. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1993.
KEAN, M.-L. Syntactic deficits in aphasia: was Wernicke right after all? Brain and Language,
v. 87, 2003.
KEMP, T. Models of diversity and phylogenetic reconstruction. In: DAWKINS, R.; RIDLEY, M.
(Eds.). Oxford surveys in evolutionary biology. Oxford University Press, 1985. v. 2.
KLUGE, A. The science of phylogenetic systematics: explanation, prediction and test.
Cladistics, v. 15, 1999.
LAUDER, G. Historical biology and the problem of design. Journal of Theoretical Biology,
v. 97, 1982.
MARCHMAN, V.; BATES, E. Continuity in lexical and morphological development: a test for
the critical mass hypothesis. Journal of Child Language, v. 21, 1994.
CARVALHO, F. O. LANGUAGE PHYLOGENY AND THE EVOLUTION...
224 REVISTA LETRAS, CURITIBA, N. 69, P. 213-224, MAIO/AGO. 2006. EDITORA UFPR.
MARCUS, G. Before the word. Nature, v. 431, 2004.
MARR, D. Vision. New York: W.H. Freeman. 1982.
MARTIN, A. Organization of semantic knowledge and the origin of words in the brain. In:
JABLONSKI, N.; AIELLO, L. (Eds.). The origin and diversification of language. Memoirs of
the California Academy of Sciences 24. 1998.
MAYNARD SMITH, J. The status of neo-darwinism. In: WADDINGTON, C. (Ed.). Towards a
theoretical biology. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1969.
MAYR, E. Cause and effect in biology. Science, v. 134, 1961.
MCSHEA, D. Complexity and evolution: what everybody knows. Biology and Philosophy, v.
6, 1991.
NOWAK, M.; KRAKAUER, D. The evolution of language. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 96.
1999.
NOWAK, M.; PLOTKIN, J.; JANSEN, V. The evolution of syntactic communication. Nature,  v.
404, 2000.
O‘HARA, R. Homage to clio, or, Toward a historical philosophy for evolutionary biology.
Syst. Zool. v. 37, 1988.
PESETSKY, D. Optimality theory and syntax: movement and pronunciation. In: ARCHANGELI,
D.; LANGENDOEN, T. (Eds.). Optimality theory: an overview. [S.l.]: Blackwell, 1997.
PINKER, S.  The language instinct. New York: Harper Collins, 1994.
_____; BLOOM, P. Natural language and natural selection. Behavioral and Brain
Sciences, v. 13, n. 4, 1990.
PLUNKETT, K.; MARCHMAN, V. From rote learning to system building: acquiring verb
morphology in children and connectionist nets. Cognition, v. 48, 1993.
PULVERMULLER, F. The neuroscience of language: brain circuits of words and serial order.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
SANIDES, F. Comparative neurology of the temporal lobe in primates including man with
reference to speech. Brain and Language, v. 2, 1975.
SEYFARTH, R.; CHENEY, D.; BERGMAN, T. Primate Social cognition and the origins of
language. Trends in Cognitive Science, v. 9, n. 6, 2005.
SIMPSON, G. Tempo and mode in evolution. New York: Columbia University Press, 1944.
TOOBY, J.; COSMIDES, L. Adaptation versus Phylogeny: The role of animal psychology in
the study of human behavior. International Journal of Comparative Psychology, v. 2, 1989.
USUI, K. et al. Conversion of semantic information into phonological representation: a
function in left posterior basal temporal area. Brain, v. 126, 2003.
WEXLER, K.; CULICOVER, P. Formal principles of language acquisition. Cambridge: MIT
Press, 1980.
WILLIAMS, G. Sex and evolution. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975.
WORDEN, R. The evolution of language from social intelligence. In: HURFORD, J.; STUDDERT-
KENNEDY, M.; KNIGHT, C. (Eds.). Approaches to the evolution of language. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1998.
